Boeing 737 Max

[I-5]

How many of you would fly on this aircraft today, no questions asked? Even more important, how many of you are engineers at Boeing who could shed light on the issues with this aircraft? I'm a big fan of Boeing, and I know that despite these two incidents, the plane has a good safety record, and that flying is far, far, far, safer than any other form of travel statistically. However, I definitely would not get on a 737 max, not until something has changed, in Boeing's response, software update and mandatory training regarding the MCAS. I do think Boeing is at fault for installing the system and not including it explicitly in their updated manuals until too late, from what I've read.

[burrrton]

What caused the crashes?

Two doesn't constitute a pattern absent that information.

[Aseahawkfan]

Boeing likely going to get sued over this. I'd fly on a 737 in America. Training in other nations shoddier than here. They may not understand the new system.

[idhawkman]

How many of you would fly on this aircraft today, no questions asked? Even more important, how many of you are engineers at Boeing who could shed light on the issues with this aircraft? I'm a big fan of Boeing, and I know that despite these two incidents, the plane has a good safety record, and that flying is far, far, far, safer than any other form of travel statistically. However, I definitely would not get on a 737 max, not until something has changed, in Boeing's response, software update and mandatory training regarding the MCAS. I do think Boeing is at fault for installing the system and not including it explicitly in their updated manuals until too late, from what I've read.

I would definitely board one if it was a US carrier. Foreign carrier - no way!

The Ethiopian air liner has a history of poor maintenance AND they had a student co-pilot. The previous plane that crashed had not trained their pilots after the announcement by Boeing. So there is that.

ON another thought, why would Boeing risk everything by stating that the planes in US and Canada are safe to fly just to have one of them crash if there is truly a defect? That would bankrupt Boeing and I just don't see that being risked by them.

[c_hawkbob]

Actually Ethiopian is a very well respected airline with a solid maintenance program and a good safety history. I wouldn't have any problem flying a 737 Max 8 on Ethiopian. I wouldn't fly anything on Lyon Air on the other hand.

It's too soon to speculate on the cause of the two crashes, although if they are software and/or training related I'm pretty sure they'll work that out now that the Jet is under such a microscope worldwide. Lucky those are two very correctable issues.

[RiverDog]

They just recovered the "black box" (they're actually orange) yesterday so it will be a few days before they have critical information about the 2nd crash.

We do know what caused the first crash. There is a new controversial automated anti stall device that is supposed to detect a stall and take corrective action by pitching the nose of the plane down. They think what happened is that the device falsely detected a stall and that the pilot, either unaware of the device or unaware of how to shut it off, did not take over and pull the nose of the aircraft up. What has made it controversial is that many pilots, including those flying for American carriers, have said that they were unaware of the device. Boeing has responded that they have been told and that the device and how to disable it is in the operator's manual.

Since the second crash shares many of the same flight characteristics of the first, many airlines/countries have grounded the plane, which is what Boeing should have done. There is not that many Max 8's on the market, less than 100 if memory serves.

Two crashes in 8 months sounds like a lot, but in the entire scheme of things, I would not feel compelled to refuse to fly on the new craft. If it is an operational error as the first one appears to have been, then surely all pilots would have familiarized themselves with the system by now. Flying is by far the safest mode of transportation.

[I-5]

Riv, I would agree with you on the cause of the first crash, as we have read. However, I wouldn't think it's accurate to call it operational error if the pilots are unaware of the MCAS feature or not informed to the degree that they need to be. There seems to be a conflict between what Boeing is saying (that they included the info about MCAS) and what pilots are saying (that there wasn't enough info shared). And that includes US pilots:

"US pilots who fly the Boeing 737 Max have registered complaints about the way the jet has performed in flight. In one of the complaints, a captain reported an autopilot anomaly which led to a brief nose-down situation -- where the front of the aircraft pointed down, according to the federal database. In another complaint, a first officer reported that the aircraft pitched nose down after the autopilot was engaged during departure. The autopilot was then disconnected and flight continued to its destination, according to the database. Although the data doesn't identify the pilots or their airlines, two US carriers fly the 737 Max 8: American Airlines and Southwest."

https://www.koamnewsnow.com/lifestyle/f ... 1058258677

[I-5]

What caused the crashes?

Two doesn't constitute a pattern absent that information.

I agree with you. The fact that 1) we don't know the answer and 2) two brand new aircraft of the exact same model that we are aware of having a new automated flight deck feature that pilots around the world are complaining about (yes, in the US as well) is enough to give me a pause. Would I fly it in the future? Yes, probably. Right now? No.

[RiverDog]

Riv, I would agree with you on the cause of the first crash, as we have read. However, I wouldn't think it's accurate to call it operational error if the pilots are unaware of the MCAS feature or not informed to the degree that they need to be. There seems to be a conflict between what Boeing is saying (that they included the info about MCAS) and what pilots are saying (that there wasn't enough info shared). And that includes US pilots: https://www.dallasnews.com/business/air ... afety-flaw

.

Operational error doesn't necessarily mean that the pilot should be held responsible. It means that the crash could have been avoided if the plane was operated correctly.

I've read reports about pilots saying that they were unaware of the anti stall system and that Boeing did not properly share such information, and if that's true, Boeing needs to be assessed a heavy fine. However, if it was included in the operator's manual like Boeing claims it was, I'd be very concerned of some of these pilots that are pleading ignorance lack the small amount of effort it takes to read information about a new aircraft that they were being asked to fly. The individual airlines might also have some responsibility if they have failed to assure that their pilots are qualified to fly the new aircraft.

We'll see what the results of the investigation of this latest crash are. The pilot was very experienced and as Cbob said, Ethiopian Air has a very good record of maintaining and operating planes. But from the sounds of it, there's plenty of blame to be spread around.

[I-5]

OK, I agree with you on operational error if that's how you define it. Usually I equate the term with with the fault being the pilot's.

We know that since the Lion Air crash, Boeing did issue a recommendation for additional training on the MCAS system, but didn't make it mandatory. That means you have no way of knowing if the pilot of your 737 max flight has undergone additional training or not. That's unfortunate.

From another article, also from US pilots:

“The story here is not why we didn’t know about (the new system), it’s why the pilots didn’t fly the plane,” said Insler. That view drew a sharp rejoinder Friday from Capt. Dennis Tajer, chairman of the communications committee of the Allied Pilots Association (APA), representing American Airlines pilots."The pilots of American Airlines, and I’m confident at Southwest Airlines too, want to know everything about all the systems on their airplanes in the interests of ensuring our passengers are safe at all times, whether in normal operations or during emergency procedures,” said Tajer in an interview. “This system is clearly not just operating in the background,” he said, citing information sent to American Airlines by Boeing. “Whenever the new system is in effect, it is not hidden; it is quite active and the airplane doesn’t do what it did in the older 737 model. It changes the handling characteristics and the flight controls.”

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... air-crash/

[idhawkman]

Cbob, you are correct. Lion is Indonesian based and is a "Low Cost Airline that is privately held". They are the ones who crashed coming out of Ethiopia. Thanks for the correction.

I-5, As far as if I'd climb on board, yep I still would. I can't tell you how many Ilyushin planes I've been on when they were the mainstay of Aeroflot airlines. Now that I'm not as indestructible as I once thought I was though, I'd only board it if it was US or CA based.

[RiverDog]

The FAA finally grounded the 737 Max, the last major nation to do so. Boeing has some major egg on their face this morning. Two crashes of the same plane in the same flight profile in 5 months is too much of a coincidence to ignore.

The initial reports would tend to indicate that this latest crash might have been the exact same cause as the previous one. The 'black box' indicates that the pilots were struggling to control the plane during takeoff.

Trump is claiming that airline manufacturers are making planes too complicated, and he might be right. It could be a case of re-inventing the wheel. One of the last controversies I found myself in...or immersed myself in...before I retired involved a similar issue, ie over automation. Engineers have this natural tendency to #@%& with things, play with gadgets. Reminds me of the cartoon about the design and installation of a playground swing.

[I-5]

Food for thought from a comment I read about how profit triumphed over safety at Boeing on the 737 Max. Again, I'm not an engineer, but would welcome any comments from someone who is:

Build an inheritently unstable aircraft and add an "MCAS" / AOA (Angle of attack) device on the outside of the aircraft to FIX in the inheritent unstableness and what do you expect? The new extra big By Pass Jet engines had to be mounted forward and higher than what that airframe was designed for, that is why the MCAS / AOA device was installed! So WRONG, and all in the name of saving a few dollars and boosting the owners profits. Now lets add Boeing convincing the FAA that no additional training would be needed by pilots switching from the old to the new, now add the Airworthyness directive that came out November 7, 2018 (AD #: 2018-23-51) that apparently MANY pilots never saw and let me see, what else, oh don't forget the nacelles of these HUGE new engines will create lift at a 14degree pitch up attitude that makes the plane misbehave and you have a recipe for DISASTER.

[RiverDog]

Food for thought from a comment I read about how profit triumphed over safety at Boeing on the 737 Max. Again, I'm not an engineer, but would welcome any comments from someone who is:

Build an inheritently unstable aircraft and add an "MCAS" / AOA (Angle of attack) device on the outside of the aircraft to FIX in the inheritent unstableness and what do you expect? The new extra big By Pass Jet engines had to be mounted forward and higher than what that airframe was designed for, that is why the MCAS / AOA device was installed! So WRONG, and all in the name of saving a few dollars and boosting the owners profits. Now lets add Boeing convincing the FAA that no additional training would be needed by pilots switching from the old to the new, now add the Airworthyness directive that came out November 7, 2018 (AD #: 2018-23-51) that apparently MANY pilots never saw and let me see, what else, oh don't forget the nacelles of these HUGE new engines will create lift at a 14degree pitch up attitude that makes the plane misbehave and you have a recipe for DISASTER.

It's not clear to me why an aircraft of which the basic model has flown successfully for over 50 years would be "inherently unstable", but as you indicated, we're not aerospace engineers.

I found a list of the new features of the 737 Max and highlighted in bold the controversial system suspected as part of the cause of at least one of the crashes:

New features:

CFM LEAP-1B fan with 18-blade, woven carbon-fiber fan blades giving a 69.4 in diameter compared to 61 in. for the 24-blade titanium fans of the CFM56-7. This gives 9:1 bypass ratio versus 5.1:1 for the older engine. Rated thrust LEAP-1B28: 29,317lbs.

New CFM LEAP-1B custom core with 11-12% reduction in fuel burn and 7% reduction in operating cost.

New engine nacelle and pylon will cause engines to project further forward than CFM56-7BE on 737NG.

Updated EEC software, fuel and pneumatic systems.

Nose gear extension of 15-20cm to give more engine ground clearance.

Minor changes to nose wheel well to accommodate longer nose gear strut.

Fly-by-wire spoiler system - to improve production flow, reduce weight and improve stopping distances.

Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) – Applies nose down stabilizer trim during high AoA flight when the flaps are up and the A/P is not engaged.

Reshaped tailcone to reduce drag giving a 1% reduction in fuel burn.

Advanced technology winglets which feature upward and downward-directed composite airfoils
Widespread structural strengthening (see why below).

Onboard Network System (ONS).

Four 15.1 inch LCD cockpit display screens in landscape orientation.

New electronic bleed air system, allowing for increased optimization of the cabin pressurization and ice protection systems, giving in better fuel burn

PSEU light changed to MAINT

http://www.b737.org.uk/737maxdiffs.htm

There's a detailed summary of all the differences between it and its predecessor in the link above, but it's a little too lengthy to paste. Someone with a little more knowledge about the subject would have to read and interpret them, but to a casual observer, it all seems pretty routine.

[I-5]

Riv, the things you listed are selling features, but from my understanding of what I read, I believe the 'unstable' comment is because the 737 was designed for a different engine, and this new engine being larger and more powerful (as well as fuel efficient), has to be mounted differently to accommodate the larger size, which creates a new AOA (angle of attack) when the plane is climbing. The reports show that the pilots do notice that the new plane does handle differently than the previous NG model. The new MCAS feature was Boeing's solution to the higher AOA that the newly mounted engines created, and the solution is to automatically push the nose of the plane down when the MCAS senses too high of an AOA that could lead to a stall. The problem is when the plane isn't actually going into a stall, but the MCAS for some reason thinks it is, causing the nose to go down when it shouldn't.

[RiverDog]

Riv, the things you listed are selling features, but from my understanding of what I read, I believe the 'unstable' comment is because the 737 was designed for a different engine, and this new engine being larger and more powerful (as well as fuel efficient), has to be mounted differently to accommodate the larger size, which creates a new AOA (angle of attack) when the plane is climbing. The reports show that the pilots do notice that the new plane does handle differently than the previous NG model. The new MCAS feature was Boeing's solution to the higher AOA that the newly mounted engines created, and the solution is to automatically push the nose of the plane down when the MCAS senses too high of an AOA that could lead to a stall. The problem is when the plane isn't actually going into a stall, but the MCAS for some reason thinks it is, causing the nose to go down when it shouldn't.

OK, that explains some of it, but as you stated, the area of concern is the automated anti stall device. There's a simple two position switch to turn it off if it malfunctions, and speculation on the first crash is that it malfunctioned but the pilot did not turn off the anti stall. Some pilots are claiming that they did not know about the anti stall device or how to disable it, which I find totally unacceptable, both on the manufacturer's part as well as the airlines and the individual pilots that are claiming ignorance. Like I said, lots of blame to spread around.

Good topic, thanks for your contributions!

[I-5]

This is the scary part from the Lion Air crash:

The sensor was wrongly telling the MAX 8’s flight computers that the aircraft was climbing much more sharply than it was. As a result, pilots were left wrestling with an aircraft that was repeatedly plunging itself towards the ground for no reason. A pilot can counteract the dive by pulling up on the control column, but MCAS will kick in again after only 10 seconds and once again tilt the plane downwards. "If this is left unchecked (it) can lead to a potential nose heavy situation where it becomes almost impossible to manually raise the nose,” reads a November assessment of the Lion Air crash by Akan Bassey, a commercial pilot and blogger.

Indeed, the final minutes of Lion Air Flight 610 show the plane veering crazily up and down as the pilot fought with MCAS for control of the aircraft. “The airplane tends to oscillate in this conflict between the software and the pilot,” Garneau, himself an experienced airman, said Wednesday. Ultimately, the Lion Air 737 pitched itself forward 26 times before pilots ultimately lost control. Adding to the confusion were stall warnings, in-cockpit alerts and faulty instrument readings, making it likely that the Lion Air pilots didn’t even know what was happening.

(https://nationalpost.com/news/heres-the ... s-grounded)

And it appears the same exact thing is what was happening on the Ethiopian Air flight. A Boeing spokesman said that one of the reasons they didn't make MCAS explicit was because pilots already have enough to think about, so this was supposed to happen in the background so that it's not even noticeable to the pilot. The problem is when there is a faulty sensor or software malfunction. The plane will continue to beep and dive every 10 seconds, even while you're wrestling it.

[Hawktawk]

The Max plane has something like 150 computers and hundreds of thousands of lines of code. Not exactly sure on the numbers as I read them on another site and don't have the link but it just occurs to me that if that is remotely accurate its overkill literally and figuratively . Too automated obviously. The robot is a mass murderer. To err is human but to truly screw up it takes a computer.The intransigence of the corporation and the FAA which is in bed with the corporation to the point of having Boeing do the inspections and make the recommendations is inexcusable.

This reminds me of the previous situation with the 737 about 25 or 30 years ago with the rudder hard over problem due to a single servo system controlling the rudder as opposed to the duplicity and multiplicity generally required coupled with the yaw deflector autopilot system. It jammed due to contaminated hydraulic fluid leading to 2 spectacular crashes, one on final approach to Colorado springs and most famously US air flight 427 which hit a wake vortex and rolled over and plunged to the ground on final approach to Pittsburgh. The FAA dragged their feet along with Boeing, blamed pilot error etc until there were other near misses with pilots fighting to regain control of planes .They finally had to admit there was a problem and retrofit the thousands of planes in service. The interim fix was to simply increase airspeed on approach to above the "crossover threshold" to allow the plane to overcome a potential hard over event. That's why flights on a 737 in the day were coming in so hot .Again it was the bean counters risking lives.

As an aside I am a white knuckle flier who avoids it like the plague. I've flown once in the last 21 years . As a lifelong wrench turner and repairman as a necessity in golf course maintenance I know anything built by human hands can fail . I know its statistically the safest way to travel but the least safe way to crash. As a guy who has survived a head on collision with a 110 MPH closing speed and being run over by a boat and hit by the out drive I should just buckle in and figure I have 7 lives left but sorry.

I don't fear dying. I just don't want to go shitting my pants spiraling down from 35 thousand feet. I cant imagine the terror experienced by these poor souls in their final minutes of life on a carnival ride to eternity. MOF the lion air plane experienced what was described as exactly that the previous flight, a "carnival ride". They replaced an air speed indicator and put it on the tarmac the following morning. Kerosene burning death tube. No Fing way I ever get on one of those no matter what they do to fix it.

[RiverDog]

And it appears the same exact thing is what was happening on the Ethiopian Air flight. A Boeing spokesman said that one of the reasons they didn't make MCAS explicit was because pilots already have enough to think about, so this was supposed to happen in the background so that it's not even noticeable to the pilot. The problem is when there is a faulty sensor or software malfunction. The plane will continue to beep and dive every 10 seconds, even while you're wrestling it.

Admittedly there are a lot of similarities between the two crashes and it would be a good guess that they are of the same cause. However, they're still in the investigation process and haven't released any details yet. I did read a report that the cockpit voice recorder indicated that they had an emergency and the pilot had requested a return to land. That and the flight profile fits the scenario of the first crash but it's still not conclusive. In addition to the auto anti-stall feature, they're looking at the jack screw assembly.

The Max plane has something like 150 computers and hundreds of thousands of lines of code. Not exactly sure on the numbers as I read them on another site and don't have the link but it just occurs to me that if that is remotely accurate its overkill literally and figuratively . Too automated obviously. The robot is a mass murderer. To err is human but to truly screw up it takes a computer. The intransigence of the corporation and the FAA which is in bed with the corporation to the point of having Boeing do the inspections and make the recommendations is inexcusable.

We probably need a qualified pilot to weigh in on the complexities of operating a modern jet airliner, but I do agree that today's engineers in general sometimes loses sight of the primary objective. There also might have been pressure from management to put too high of a priority on fuel economy over safety and ease of operation.

In my particular battle with engineers, I actually got some of my managers to agree that our automated process control was a bad thing, that it was not saving them any money, compromised finished quality, and had the effect of making operators complacent and inattentive. But they did not want to admit that they'd spent a couple of million dollars with more in the pipeline on a system that was severely flawed so they searched for ways to justify it. No one wanted to admit to their managers that they made a mistake.

I don't know how analogous my situation was with the design of the 737 Max, but it seems plausible to think that there are some common threads.

[I-5]

I take back what I said in my OP. I’ll never get on a Max 8-9 again, and will have a hard time getting on any 737 (though they are hard to avoid for domestic routes. I don’t know if I believe it’s really a software issue more then a flawed design based on saving money (maxing profit). The FAA is just as guilty, if not more. Boeing safety engineers themselves issued this safety analysis, but the FAA approved the plane anyway;

1. Understated the power of the new flight control system, which was designed to swivel the horizontal tail to push the nose of the plane down to avert a stall. When the planes later entered service, MCAS was capable of moving the tail more than four times farther than was stated in the initial safety analysis document.
2. Failed to account for how the system could reset itself each time a pilot responded, thereby missing the potential impact of the system repeatedly pushing the airplane’s nose downward.
3. Assessed a failure of the system as one level below “catastrophic.” But even that “hazardous” danger level should have precluded activation of the system based on input from a single sensor — and yet that’s how it was designed.

https://moneymaven.io/mishtalk/economic ... kDJn3Jy8A/

[RiverDog]

I take back what I said in my OP. I’ll never get on a Max 8-9 again, and will have a hard time getting on any 737 (though they are hard to avoid for domestic routes. I don’t know if I believe it’s really a software issue more then a flawed design based on saving money (maxing profit). The FAA is just as guilty, if not more. Boeing safety engineers themselves issued this safety analysis, but the FAA approved the plane anyway;

1. Understated the power of the new flight control system, which was designed to swivel the horizontal tail to push the nose of the plane down to avert a stall. When the planes later entered service, MCAS was capable of moving the tail more than four times farther than was stated in the initial safety analysis document.
2. Failed to account for how the system could reset itself each time a pilot responded, thereby missing the potential impact of the system repeatedly pushing the airplane’s nose downward.
3. Assessed a failure of the system as one level below “catastrophic.” But even that “hazardous” danger level should have precluded activation of the system based on input from a single sensor — and yet that’s how it was designed.

https://moneymaven.io/mishtalk/economic ... kDJn3Jy8A/

I agree with your assessment, but not with your reaction to it (never fly on a 737 again). They'll get it figured out before they fly again. Airline travel in general is far, far safer, and the 737 model is the most popular model of passenger aircraft in the world.

One of the problems is that the domestic airline manufacturing industry has just one, company: Boeing. The people at the FAA know far, far less about modern aircraft design and construction than do the engineers at Boeing, the company they are supposed to be regulating, and as a result, they depend heavily on Boeing engineers to do the right thing. If those engineers lose sight of the operational aspects of a plane and become enamored with gadgetry, something I eluded to in my previous rant, or if they feel the pressure of management to prioritize economy over safety, then coupled with the fact that the FAA can't be counted on to throw up a red flag, it's a recipe for a flawed process.

It's not too different than the problems they had with the space shuttle. When space flight started to become routine...prior to the Challenger accident, we had never lost a man/woman in flight for 25+ years...they got complacent and started worrying more about meeting schedules and budgets while safety took a back seat. The same mentality could be affecting the aerospace industry: Airline travel is so routine and uneventful that they begin to take safety as a given.

[I-5]

I agree with what you said about engineers and over thinking. From what I’m reading, the software was not the problem, it performed as it was designed to. The problem seems more in the design decisions that were made, that affected both fatal flights (and a few non fatal flights). Namely; putting a new engine on an older frame that wasn’t meant to handle it thereby changing the centre of gravity and behaviour especially at takeoff; installing a sophisticated automated system without proper training (pilots got a 1 hour iPad session); having the new system take a reading from only one of the AoA sensors, even though each plane has two (that alone might have saved both flights); selling the planes without the inclusion of warning lights as standard equipment (it was available only as an option which neither plane had); and not designing an easy way to allow pilots to take back control (the system would keep resetting itself using wrong data after every pilot action, thereby countering it with an even more extreme pitch down, imagine the terror of both the crew and passengers feeling helpless and not knowing why). I don’t see a software malfunction in any of those issues; I see fatal decisions. Lastly, the FAA definitely neglected to adequately perform their function as you have shown above.

Anyway, I only applied the word ‘never’ to the Max 8-9, not to all 737’s if you read my comment.

Thanks for the thoughtful exchange either way.

[RiverDog]

I agree with what you said about engineers and over thinking. From what I’m reading, the software was not the problem, it performed as it was designed to. The problem seems more in the design decisions that were made, that affected both fatal flights (and a few non fatal flights). Namely; putting a new engine on an older frame that wasn’t meant to handle it thereby changing the centre of gravity and behaviour especially at takeoff; installing a sophisticated automated system without proper training (pilots got a 1 hour iPad session); having the new system take a reading from only one of the AoA sensors, even though each plane has two (that alone might have saved both flights); selling the planes without the inclusion of warning lights as standard equipment (it was available only as an option which neither plane had); and not designing an easy way to allow pilots to take back control (the system would keep resetting itself using wrong data after every pilot action, thereby countering it with an even more extreme pitch down, imagine the terror of both the crew and passengers feeling helpless and not knowing why). I don’t see a software malfunction in any of those issues; I see fatal decisions. Lastly, the FAA definitely neglected to adequately perform their function as you have shown above.

Anyway, I only applied the word ‘never’ to the Max 8-9, not to all 737’s if you read my comment.

Thanks for the thoughtful exchange either way.

I apologize for using the word 'never' in regards to your willingness to fly 737's. I got the sense that the only reason why you flew in them was that due to their popularity, that it wasn't practical for you to do so. Suffice it to say that we have a difference in comfort level with regards to flying on 737 and/or the Max 8.

From what I gathered, the suspected problem lies in the anti stall software getting fooled by a malfunctioning sensor that was detecting stall conditions and putting the aircraft in a dive. I know that's an over simplification of the problem, but to me, the failure to detect a malfunctioning sensor is a software problem.

Once again, I have to qualify my remarks by saying that I'm not an engineer, let alone an aerospace engineer, but it would seem to me that there is enough telemetry available from other systems independent of the sensors in the plane, such as the plane's radar or even ground based radar, that the system should be able to detect conflicting information, shut the automated system that's reporting conflicting data, and surrender control of the aircraft to the pilot rather than trust the faulty sensor and automatically put the plane into a dive. That goes for other systems besides the anti stall feature: In order for automated systems to be trusted with something that is as critically important as an aircraft in it's most dangerous section of its flight, they should always be cross checking each other to make sure that they all agree on critical data like air speed, trajectory, etc.

I see now that the government is going to investigate how the FAA approved the Max 8. My preference is that they appoint a Presidential commission similar to what NASA has done in their fatal accidents and not just trust it to a bunch of bureaucrats.

[RiverDog]

I saw where "Sully", the pilot that saved his plane by landing it in the Hudson River, blasted Boeing and the FAA of having a "cozy relationship". More PR headaches.

And now, the FBI is joining in on a criminal investigation of the airline manufacturer:

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/fbi-j ... spartanntp

I'd love to be a fly on a wall during their next board of directors meeting.

[I-5]

“Boeing, in developing the 737 Max 8, obviously felt intense competitive pressure to get the new aircraft to market as quickly as possible. When flight testing revealed an issue with meeting the certification standards, they developed a fix, Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), but did not tell airline pilots about it. In mitigating one risk, they seem to have created another, greater risk."

- Captain Chester ‘Sully’ Sullenberger, retired

He’s not wrong

[RiverDog]

“Boeing, in developing the 737 Max 8, obviously felt intense competitive pressure to get the new aircraft to market as quickly as possible. When flight testing revealed an issue with meeting the certification standards, they developed a fix, Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), but did not tell airline pilots about it. In mitigating one risk, they seem to have created another, greater risk."

- Captain Chester ‘Sully’ Sullenberger, retired

He’s not wrong

I saw where the exact same Lion plane that crashed had a problem the very day before where an off duty pilot intervened, identified the malfunctioning MCAS instructed the pilots as to how to correct the problem, and saved the plane.

IMHO although I agree that Boeing and the FAA have some major problems, this particular airline has more accountability in that one crash than the manufacturer. Why did they continue to fly that plane? Did they not interview their pilots as to what happened and how they corrected it? Why would one pilot know how to disable the system and the two other pilots not?

[I-5]

Those are very good questions. I feel the same way. In hindsight they should have grounded the planes if there had been problems reported previous flights, but someone ultimately decided that the problems had been fixed. Regarding the off duty pilot who rescued the previous flight, it’s frustraying that he knew the problem but the crew didn’t. Everyone should have the same info. It’s tragic the pilots on the doomed flights were frantically trying to scour the manual for a piece of info they would never have found in the manual. It doesn’t help that all kids of bells and alarms are going off around them. Boeing has always been known to let pilots control their planes, so this MCAS automatic feature is huge shift away from that reputation - they will have to earn back the lost trust. Bottom line, they shouldn’t make it complicated to take control of the plane back to the pilot.

[RiverDog]

Those are very good questions. I feel the same way. In hindsight they should have grounded the planes if there had been problems reported previous flights, but someone ultimately decided that the problems had been fixed. Regarding the off duty pilot who rescued the previous flight, it’s frustraying that he knew the problem but the crew didn’t. Everyone should have the same info. It’s tragic the pilots on the doomed flights were frantically trying to scour the manual for a piece of info they would never have found in the manual. It doesn’t help that all kids of bells and alarms are going off around them. Boeing has always been known to let pilots control their planes, so this MCAS automatic feature is huge shift away from that reputation - they will have to earn back the lost trust. Bottom line, they shouldn’t make it complicated to take control of the plane back to the pilot.

My understanding about Lion Air is that they are one of the more lax airlines, but nevertheless, the fact that some pilots are expressing shock that the information on the MCAS system was not given even though it was available to them in the operator's manual is a concern for me. IMO the pilots, in general, are just as guilty of complacency as the airlines, the manufacturer, and the FAA. They should have read about that feature and if they didn't understand it, they should have started asking questions. Because of the nearly impeccable record on safety, they've all taken safe air travel for granted.

A few weeks ago, I had a conversation with a state trooper about the alarming number of weather related accidents during the first few weeks of our February snowstorm. It was his opinion that we've added so many conveniences and safety features..AWD, traction control, outdoor thermometers, heated leather seats, GPS, radar, etc...into modern cars that the driver becomes too mentally insulated to the treacherous conditions just outside his or her little sterile bubble. IMO the same thing may be at work in this episode with the 737 Max: We've made things too easy for them. It's good that they're having this wake-up call.

[I-5]

Correct me if I’m wrong, but my understanding is that MCAS wasn’t mentioned in the training manuals, except some pilots received a 1.5 hr iPad lesson (no simulator).

[RiverDog]

Correct me if I’m wrong, but my understanding is that MCAS wasn’t mentioned in the training manuals, except some pilots received a 1.5 hr iPad lesson (no simulator).

I'll have to concede. I was sure that when the 2nd crash first happened that Boeing stated that the information about MCAS and how to disable it was contained in the operators manual, but all I could come up with was this:

There’s no explanation of MCAS, nor the steps needed to counter it in U.S. and European pilot manuals. Boeing reasoned that pilots were already drilled to counter similar behavior by the 737’s horizontal stabilizer by running through a checklist and flipping two center console switches. The FAA reviewed Boeing’s analysis and agreed.

The MCAS does make an appearance in American Airlines Group Inc.’s flight crew operations manual — in a section that lists acronyms.

Thanks for the correction! I learned something today.

[I-5]

Thanks for your candor. It will be interesting to say the least how Boeing’s presentation with pilots on the MCAS updates goes this week. You know one of the questions will inevitably be, ‘why wasn’t this done in the first place?’. I think the FAA relationship will also have to change moving forward, but first things first.

[RiverDog]

I think the FAA relationship will also have to change moving forward, but first things first.

It must be extremely awkward for the FAA to be regulating just one domestic manufacturer. It's almost inevitable that inspectors will develop personal relationships with Boeing employees and for biases to set in. Additionally, as a result of Boeing's total monopoly, FAA inspectors do not have other manufacturers to compare them with.

[I-5]

Pretty damning account from a US pilot (who was already certified for the 737 Max) about what he encountered when he requested more training. Combined with the report coming out from Ethiopia that clears the pilots of blame, and that they in fact did follow the protocol recommended by the manufacturer:

“After completing it, over the next couple of days I got to thinking that, you know, they said it wasn’t a different airplane, it was just the same airplane with some differences,” he said. “But I went back over my notes, and I went back in the iPad and reviewed some of the information and I realized it was actually, it was the same airframe, but it had different instrumentation, some of the things were in different places, it sat on the ground differently, and it was just a different airplane.”

At least two communications sent around by the airline noted pilots would see some differences between what was shown in the iPad tutorial and the actual Max. He told his superiors he wasn’t comfortable flying the plane and requested simulator training.

“I was going to see the airplane for the first time 45 minutes before departure, and have 45 minutes to adjust to this new aircraft, after which I was going to have 189 people in the back that I was responsible for,” he said. “So I filed a report with the company that I’m not comfortable flying as a pilot in command of this.”

https://qz.com/1584233/boeing-737-max-w ... -training/

[RiverDog]

Yea, it's turned into a major scandal, very similar to the Challenger accident in that a lot has to do with people getting complacent and taking safety for granted. The industry was due for a wake-up call. Except for the obvious fact that several hundred people had to die before we got to this point, in the end, things will improve.

[I-5]

I agree. Things always improve after tragic accidents like these two. Unfortunately, those people unwillingly paid a price for our future safety, including the pilots who did the best with what they were given. RIP.

I can't imagine what it's like to be people at Boeing and the FAA who coerced the fast tracking of the certification of the Max to compete with A320 Neo. They have blood on their hands, not to mention the engineers and other lower level administrators who either willingly or unwillingly did the work to get the certification.

[burrrton]

Maybe it's just the optimist in me, but I can't believe there isn't more to this story.

I'm having trouble accepting that this went down as it's being presented.

[RiverDog]

I agree. Things always improve after tragic accidents like these two. Unfortunately, those people unwillingly paid a price for our future safety, including the pilots who did the best with what they were given. RIP.

I can't imagine what it's like to be people at Boeing and the FAA who coerced the fast tracking of the certification of the Max to compete with A320 Neo. They have blood on their hands, not to mention the engineers and other lower level administrators who either willingly or unwillingly did the work to get the certification.

I'm not letting the pilots off the hook just yet, at least not the ones in the Lion Air crash where the very same plane showing the same malfunction was successfully flown when a more knowledgeable observer pilot knew how to correct the situation. I would like to know how he knew yet other pilots didn't. That doesn't absolve Boeing, the FAA, or the individual airlines, just that the pilots have yet to be fully exonerated.

There's a natural tendency for us to blame the "non-human" company, organization, or agency vs. a specific individual like a pilot.

[I-5]

I was talking about the Ethiopian Air pilots who did follow the Boeing-recommended protocol. That's the one I read about at least. They did what they were taught to do. They even did the simulator, but apparently the simulator didn't have the full experience of MCAS. The fact Boeing has so many changes upcoming in the software fix should tell us something, the biggest of which is that MCAS will now be receiving input from both AOA sensors instead of one. That alone could have saved the lives of everyone on both planes.

The Seattle Times article below sheds a little more light on what the cockpit was like. The last line is ominous:

"The Ethiopian pilots most likely were unable to carry out that last instruction in the Boeing emergency procedure — because they simply couldn’t physically move that wheel against the heavy forces acting on the tail. “The forces on the tail could have been too great,” Lemme said. “They couldn’t turn the manual trim wheel.”

The stabilizer in the Ethiopian jet could have been in an extreme position with two separate forces acting on it: MCAS had swiveled the stabilizer upward by turning a large mechanical screw inside the tail called the jackscrew. This is pushing the jet’s nose down. But the pilot had pulled his control column far back in an attempt to counter, which would flip up a separate movable surface called the elevator on the trailing edge of the tail.
The elevator and stabilizer normally work together to minimize the loads on the jackscrew. But in certain conditions, the elevator and stabilizer loads combine to present high forces on the jackscrew and make it very difficult to turn manually. As the jet’s airspeed increases — and with nose down it will accelerate — these forces grow even stronger.

In this scenario, the air flow pushing downward against the elevator would have created an equal and opposite load on the jackscrew, a force tending to hold the stabilizer in its upward displacement. This heavy force would resist the pilot’s manual effort to swivel the stabilizer back down. This analysis suggests the stabilizer trim wheel at the Ethiopian captain’s right hand could have been difficult to budge. As a result, the pilots would have struggled to get the nose up and the plane to climb. If after much physical exertion failed, the pilots gave up their manual strategy and switched the electric trim system back on — as indicated in the preliminary reports on the Ethiopian flight — MCAS would have begun pushing the nose down again.

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... an-flight/

[I-5]

On the contrary Riv, I think there's a tendency to say 'pilot error' and absolve the manufacturer. It took more than a few incidents with the fatal rudder malfunctions of the 737 in the 1980's before we realized something was wrong with the aircraft design.

Edit:

This is a welcome statement from Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg:

"The history of our industry shows most accidents are caused by a chain of events. This again is the case here, and we know we can break one of those chain links in these two accidents," Boeing chairman-CEO Dennis Muilenburg said in a written statement.

"As pilots have told us, erroneous activation of the MCAS function can add to what is already a high workload environment. It's our responsibility to eliminate this risk. We own it and we know how to do it."

[RiverDog]

On the contrary Riv, I think there's a tendency to say 'pilot error' and absolve the manufacturer. It took more than a few incidents with the fatal rudder malfunctions of the 737 in the 1980's before we realized something was wrong with the aircraft design.

The tendency to assign pilot error to an accident is the natural tendency of the people that designed, built, and approved the plane, ie Boeing and the FAA. They have a very human response to be defensive of their work. It is not the inclination of people like you and me. We are more comfortable blaming an inanimate object than we are a pilot with a wife and two kids.